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1. Introduction  
In recent years, welfare state reforms in Europe have tended to be characterised by a shift in 
emphasis from the use of passive to that of active labour market policies. The combination of 
relatively low employment protection and interventions targeted towards an increase in workers’ 
employability often includes direct job creation measures such as wage and employment 
subsidies.1  This type of subsidies accounted for about 25% of total active labour market policies 
on average in the OECD in 2003 and their use was intensified in the last decade during the 
recession.  In addition, whilst they have often been introduced to support specific types of 
workers (such as the young or the long-term unemployed), they have increasingly been perceived 
as a means to sustain job creation more generally2 and demands for targeting them towards 
specific types of firms (as opposed to specific types of workers) and/or sectors have abounded.3  
 The literature on the assessment of employment creation policies has often adopted partial 
equilibrium approaches in which the focus is placed on microeconomic incentives for individual 
workers and/or firms. These policies, however, have implications that go beyond individual 
agents’ behaviour and affect aggregate performance via aggregation effects that start from the 
industry level.  
 In this paper we show that competitive selection forces within an industry shape the general 
equilibrium effects of these policies and, in the presence of cross-country externalities, they 
influence the strategic behaviour of governments.  Specifically, within a two-country model 
characterised by firm heterogeneity and endogenous labour supply, we investigate how the 
interaction between economic openness and competitive selection determines the effects of wage 
subsidies on aggregate productivity and employment, and how international policy spill-overs 
affect governments’ incentives in adopting them. 
 From a theoretical perspective, a wage or employment subsidy can be justified if it corrects 
distortions that render the market equilibrium suboptimal.4 Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) show that 
when the consumption bundle consists of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) basket of 
varieties of a differentiated good produced under monopolistic competition and a homogenous 
                                                 
1 These policies are central to the “European Employment Strategy” and are a cornerstone of the Social Investment 
model of the welfare state.  
2 Endorsed by the ILO (2010) and the IMF (2013), employment subsidy schemes have been widely used, e.g.: in 
Germany, Ireland and Japan (OECD, 2009, Kluve, 2010).  
3 For instance, Marzinotto et al. (2011) suggest that unused EU structural funds could be employed to target wage 
subsidies to promote job creation in the exportable sector as a means to reducing external debt burdens. In a similar 
vein, the Irish Exporter Association argued for the Employment Subsidy Scheme Second Round (2009) to be 
expanded and more focussed towards supporting exports.  
4 Dating back to Pigou (1933) and Kaldor (1936), an extensive literature has examined the impact of employment 
subsidies (see, e.g.: Johnson, 1980; Jackman and Layard, 1980; Layard and Nickell, 1980; Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 2003; Cardullo and van der Linden, 2006). A significant strand of this literature, however, does not rely 
on general equilibrium frameworks, and/or limits the analysis to closed economy settings. Molana et al. (2012) 
study the role of employment subsidies in a general equilibrium open economy model but do not allow for 
heterogeneity across firms. Bilbiie et al. (2008) examine the effectiveness of labour, sales and other subsidies as 
counter-cyclical stabilisation policy tools in raising employment and output within a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model, but do not allow for intra-industry selection effects. 
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good produced competitively, differences in price mark-ups between sectors result in an 
inefficient market allocation corresponding to an under-consumption of the differentiated good. 
Subsidising its production is shown to reduce the impact of this distortion by reallocating 
resources across sectors.  If, instead of another consumption good, the outside good is leisure, 
with consumers determining their labour supply endogenously, the monopolistic distortion 
highlighted by Dixit and Stiglitz goes through implying that labour is under-utilised. It is then 
straightforward to devise a wage subsidy scheme that, at least partially, corrects this distortion, 
yields higher employment and output and raises consumers’ utility. As we show in this paper, 
with firm heterogeneity, which implies the endogeneity of marginal and average industry 
productivities, intra-industry competitive selection is an additional channel which shapes policy 
effectiveness and the strategic interaction between governments.  Specifically, we show that 
wage subsidies do not only affect aggregate employment directly, but also via changes in 
aggregate productivity that result from reallocation effects across countries, away from leisure, 
and across firms. Ultimately, via a wage subsidy, governments control the selectivity of 
competition and thus contribute to correcting the market distortion that results in an under-
consumption of the differentiated good and an under-utilisation of labour.  Crucially, whilst a 
uniform subsidy reduces the selectivity of competition, making it easier to survive in the industry 
and thus reducing average industry productivity, it increases aggregate employment, product 
variety, and welfare. In this context, international policy spillovers, consisting of selection and 
fiscal externalities, lead to non-cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria that are 
characterised by positive subsidies. The Nash equilibrium, however, entails levels of 
subsidisation that fall short of those characterising the cooperative outcome. Targeted 
subsidisation, to either the domestic-only or the export operations of firms, is shown to be 
dominated from a welfare point of view by a uniform subsidy.  
 Reforms of product markets – particularly aimed at facilitating entry – are considered as an 
effective means to increase aggregate productivity and employment.5 Our analysis of an entry 
subsidy reveals that whilst it always increases the strength of selection forces and hence average 
productivity in the industry, it is less effective in raising employment and welfare than a wage 
subsidy. This is due to the fact that the latter enables the government to tackle the monopolistic 
distortion more directly. 
 Our work is also related to a strand of the literature that highlights the impact of intra-industry 
reallocations on aggregate performance. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) find that the size 
composition of industries interacts with trade openness in determining aggregate output 
volatility. Several studies document how misallocations across heterogeneous production units 
can affect aggregate productivity and the transmission of shocks (e.g., Baily et al., 1992; 
Restuccia and Rogerson, 2010, Görg et al., 2017). Of particular interest is the fact that different 
                                                 
5 As Blanchard et al. (2014) state, “Structural reform in product markets – particularly lowering barriers to entry 
of new firms – is likely to produce a larger growth payoff than reform in labor markets”.  
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firms exhibit different cyclical patterns of net job creation (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2012; 
Elsby and Michaels, 2013). These papers, however, do not consider the interaction between 
competitive selection on the one hand, and labour market policies aimed at increasing 
employment and trade openness on the other.  
 Another (still fairly small) strand of the literature to which our work is related concerns the 
impact of policy on competitive selection. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) focus on the 
effects of trade policy in a small open economy, whilst Felbermayr et al. (2013) consider non-
cooperative tariff policies within a two-country setting.  Contrary to our model, both of these 
papers assume an exogenous labour supply in a one sector economy and their focus is not on 
employment creation policies.6  Pflüger and Suedekum (2013) develop a two-country model to 
analyse strategic interaction between governments in setting entry subsidies financed via lump-
sum taxation; they too treat labour supply as fixed but introduce a competitively produced and 
freely traded homogenous outside good as a substitute for the CES basket, maintain a constant 
expenditure on the latter, and focus on the role of asymmetries across countries.   
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses optimal wage policy in the 
closed economy case. Section 3 extends the model to a two-country setting, analyses the strategic 
subsidy games between governments and examines the role of trade liberalisation. Section 4 
compares the impact of wage and entry subsidies and Section 5 concludes the paper. All the 
figures and tables are presented in an appendix at the end of the paper. 
 
 
2. The model in autarkic setting 
The economy produces a horizontally differentiated good with labour as the only factor of 
production. Labour supply is endogenous, firms have different productivity levels and all receive 
a wage subsidy from the government financed by levying a lump-sum tax on consumers.  
 
2.1. Demand and technology  
The representative household’s utility is defined over consumption Y and leisure time H, 
   
1 1
, 0, 0, 0,
1 1
Y HU
     
 
       (1) 
where  and  measure the degree of relative risk aversion with respect to consumption and 
leisure and determine the extent of the substitution and income effects. The household has a time 
endowment which is divided between leisure and work. Normalising the time endowment to 
unity and noting that the working time is allocated between time spent on setting up firms and 
on working for them, denoted by E and L respectively, the time constraint is,  
                                                 
6 In a recent paper, Haaland and Venables (2016) derive optimal import tariffs, domestic sales and export subsidies 
in a two sector model of a small open economy. By allowing for labour supply in the monopolistic sector to be 
flexible or fixed, the model generalises the results obtained via special cases in the literature.  
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  1 .E L H    (2) 
The budget constraint facing the household is 
  ,netPY wL T     (3) 
where P is price of the consumption good, w is the wage rate, net  is the net profit of entry and 
T is a lump-sum tax.  The first order conditions for choosing Y and H to maximise (1) subject to 
(2) and (3) yield7     
  .Y w
H P


    (4) 
 Y is assumed to consist of a CES basket of differentiated varieties with a dual price index, 
respectively given by 
       
1 1
1 1/ 11 1/ 1
  and   ,
i M i M
Y y i di P p i di
    
 
              (5) 
where M is the set of available varieties,  y i  and  p i  are the quantity and the price of variety 
i respectively, and  >1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties. Thus, 
   
i M
PY p i y i di

   holds and demand for a typical variety i is  
      , .p iy i Y i M
P
    
  (6) 
 Each firm employs labour as the only input to produce one variety of the good using a linear 
technology with increasing returns to scale. Dropping the variety indicator i and distinguishing 
firms by their productivity parameter  1, ,    the labour requirement to produce and market 
a quantity y of the good is     ,l y      where  is the fixed labour input. A firm’s profit 
is          1 ,p y s wl        where [0,1)s  is the wage subsidy rate that the firm 
receives from the government. Profit maximisation under standard monopolistically competitive 
assumptions then yields the familiar mark-up rule      1 1p s w      , which can be 
used to write the operating profits as      1 ,r s w        where      r p y    is 
the revenue.  
 As in Melitz (2003), before they can set up and start producing, a large pool F of identical 
potential entrants each undertake a fixed sunk investment e, measured in terms of labour, that 
enables them to draw a productivity parameter from a common population with a known p.d.f. 
 g   defined over support  1,    with a continuous c.d.f.  G  . A firm’s survival in the 
market will depend on the magnitude of its  in relation to the threshold ˆ   which satisfies 
                                                 
7 Although an explicit labour supply function cannot be derived unless some additional restriction, e.g. =, is 
imposed, it can be shown that the labour supply based on (2), (3) and (4) is well-behaved and has the standard 
properties. 
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 ˆ 0    and defines the marginal firms; only firms with  ˆ,    will produce, making non-
negative profits, whilst those with  ˆ1,   will not produce and will exit.  Prior to entry, 
therefore, it is known that a fraction  ˆG   of F will be unsuccessful, while a subset 
  ˆ1M G F   will succeed and start production; ex-post, M is the mass of varieties available 
to consumers. We can therefore redefine the p.d.f. of the surviving firms’ productivity over 
 ˆ,    by       ˆ1 ,g G      which can be used to obtain a measure of the average 
productivity of the industry as the weighted average of surviving firms’ productivity,8 
   
1
1
1
ˆ
.d



    
 
        (7) 
All aggregate measures can then be written in terms of the average productivity, e.g. aggregate 
employment is  .L Ml      
 
2.2. General equilibrium  
We assume that entry continues until the expected profit from entry is zero. Since each entry 
attempt requires a fixed amount of labour time e, it follows that E eF . Then the entry condition 
implies   
     0.net M weF       (8) 
 The time constraint in (2) ensures that the labour market clearing condition,  
    1 ,Ml eF H      (9) 
is satisfied. The goods market clearing condition is 
    ,Mr P Y    (10) 
and the government budget constraint requires9  
    .swMl T    (11) 
 Finally, the marginal firms’ zero profit condition implies  
     ˆ 1 .r s w      (12) 
                                                 
8 Following Melitz (2003), define  
1
1 ( ) ( ) ( )y y d

      

        and note that      y y
      which can 
be substituted back in the definition of   to obtain equation (7).  
9 We assume that the government sets a uniform subsidy rate common to all firms in the industry. Although this 
assumption is plausible, in light of the high informational requirements of firm-specific intervention, it is also 
consistent with the fact that with CES preferences (where firms’ mark-up does not depend on their productivity) the 
subsidy should be the same for all firms – contrary to the case of firm-specific market power where it is well known 
that first-best policies depend on firms’ productivity; see e.g., Leahy and Montagna (2001) and Nocco et al. (2014).  
6 
 
 Given that                ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,   and  ,p p y y r p y                 it follows 
that       1ˆ ˆr r        which we use with (12) to obtain 
       1ˆ1 .r s           (13) 
 All the relevant variables can then be written in terms of the productivity cut-off, ˆ,  and the 
average productivity, .   In particular, we have   
     1/(1 ) 1 1 ,P M s w         (14) 
         1ˆ1 1 ,s w              (15) 
       1ˆ1 1 .l              (16) 
 The above equations complete the model, which can be solved to determine F, M, H, L, P, Y,
        ˆ, , , , ,l r y            and T when the subsidy rate s is used as the policy tool, and 
1w   is imposed by using labour as the numeraire.  In order to obtain closed form solutions, we 
use the Pareto distribution and let  
       (1 )1 and   , 1, , 1,G g                  (17) 
where  is the shape parameter which provides an inverse measure of firms’ productivity 
dispersion:  the smaller is , the higher is the degree of productivity heterogeneity and the average 
productivity in the industry.10   Then,  ˆ ˆ1 G      and (7), and   ˆ1M G F    
respectively imply  
  1 1ˆ ,
1
   
      
   (18) 
   ˆ .M F   (19) 
 The model can be solved to express all the endogenous variables in terms of the parameters 
and a given value of the subsidy,  , , , , , , , .e s        Using a tilde over a variable to denote 
that it relates to firms with average productivity, we obtain:    1 ,
1
l s
  
 
   

   1 ,
1
s
r s

 
     
  1 1 ,
1
s
s
   
      
  
 
1 1/
1 1 1
1 1
s
s
e
      
               
 . The 
productivity cut-off, is given by 
       
1/
1 1ˆ .
1
s
s
e
   
       
   (20) 
                                                 
10 In the Pareto distribution, both mean and variance are negatively related to the shape parameter  
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 Whilst average firm-level employment  l s  is constant,        ˆ, , ,  and r s s s s     are all 
decreasing in s. Thus, a higher subsidy reduces the productivity cut-off, making it easier to 
survive in the industry. This is reflected in a lower average industry productivity and profits. 
Also, for any given s, ˆ 0 :     the minimum productivity required to survive in equilibrium 
is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity between firms.  
 In addition, we can obtain a unique equation that determines M namely, 
  
   
      
  
 
1
1
1 1 1 1
1 11 1
1 11 11
1
.
1
1 1
1   
1
M
e
s
s M
 
    


  

  
 


   
    
 




       
   

 
   
    


     
  (21) 
However, the nonlinearity of the left-hand-side of (21) restricts the choice of analytically 
tractable solutions; explicit solutions could be obtained by imposing parameter restrictions (e.g. 
=1), but such solutions would be of limited value and still involve complex nonlinear 
combinations of the parameters which would make analytical comparative statics impossible.  
Nevertheless, scrutinising equation (21) shows that a unique interior solution for all plausible 
parameter values exists and therefore numerical analysis can be used to carry out robust 
comparative statics.  
 
2.3. Numerical solution 
In our numerical simulations we shall use an initial solution which is obtained as follows. First, 
we use the solutions that determine, for a given M and s, the allocation of time between leisure, 
entry and production, namely, 
  1 1
,
1
s M
H
    
 
      
  1 1 ,
1
s M
E
 
 
     and  
 1
1
M
L
  
 
     which should satisfy the time constraint 1 .E L H     The total work 
time E L  is approximated by the number of hours a ‘typical’ employee is expected to work in 
a year once we allow for statutory working hours, holidays and weekends.  We have used the 
UK data according to which 0.27E L   and 0.73.H   The above therefore are four equations 
which together with (21) determine the values of M, E, L consistently with the chosen values of 
 , , , , , , , .e s       The following points were taken into account when choosing the parameter 
values:   
(a)   The values of  and  are chosen to reflect the relative risk aversion attitude towards 
consumption and leisure. We have set 0.25   and 0.5    which lie in the commonly 
used range – see, e.g., Gandelman and Hernandez-Murillo (2015). While  >  is a 
plausible assumption, we have verified that changing the values and/or reversing the 
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inequality does not alter the qualitative nature of the solution and the response of 
variables to a rise in s.  
(b)   A relatively wide range of values for the elasticity of substitution parameter  has been 
used in the literature. Our choice, 3.8,   is within the standard range and numerical 
experiments show that the results remain robust to perturbing this value.  
(c)   The Pareto shape parameter,  , needs to satisfy the restriction  > 1 to ensure positive 
values for some of the solutions. In addition,  >2 ought to hold in order to conform to 
the consistency of the distribution function properties.  Our initial choice, 3.1,   is 
reasonable but we also report how the solutions respond to a change in this value.  In our 
analysis, the values of  and   are in line with those suggested in Ghironi and Melitz 
(2005) and Pflüger and Suedekum (2013).11   
(d)   Evaluating the above mentioned five equations at 0, 0.73, 0.25, 0.5,s H       
3.1,   and 3.8   we find the initial (no subsidy policy) values for M, L and E and are 
left with two equations in e,  and   e and  are the fixed labour inputs and their values 
determines the size of the economy. We set 0.00035e   and solve these two equations 
to obtain 0.00025, 7.25.     Note that   is simply a scale parameter and e >  is a 
plausible assumption commonly used in the literature – e.g. Pflüger and Suedekum 
(2013) set 2 .e   
 Experiments with changing the parameter values and with [0,1)s  show that the uniqueness 
of the interior solution and concavity of  U s  are robust.  Figure 1 illustrates the solutions, 
obtained at the above mentioned parameter values and the relevant range of s, for key 
endogenous variables.  
 
2.4. Optimal policy  
The optimal policy involves choosing the value of s which maximises  .U s  As can be seen 
from Figure 1,  U s  is strictly concave in s and reaches a unique maximum at some  0,1 .opts    
In addition, 0:optds d   the less heterogeneous are firm productivities, the larger is the optimal 
subsidy – which reflects the fact that at higher values of   the subsidy has a lower marginal 
effect. Consistently, ˆ 0:opt     at the optimum, the value of the productivity cut-off is lower 
(and so is the average productivity in the industry) the less heterogeneous are firms.   
                                                 
11 Our numerical analysis was based on the <  interval.   
9 
 
 The distortion underpinning the optimality of policy intervention results from the mark-up 
pricing which creates a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of 
transformation between leisure (which acts as an outside good) and consumption. In this 
situation, the market outcome is characterised by a sub-optimal level of consumption of the 
differentiated product and an excessive consumption of leisure.  In contributing to correct this 
distortion, the subsidy reduces leisure and shifts resources towards production. This point is well 
understood since Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and is not altered by the existence of intra-industry 
heterogeneity with CES preferences (Dhingra and Morrow, 2015). In addition, note that the 
homogenous productivity case can be obtained as a special case of the above: in the limit, as 
,   all firms draw the same productivity level with probability one. Since  lim 0,1opts    
and is constant, (20) implies ˆlim 1.opt    Given firms’ optimal price rule, 
     1 1 ,p s w       it then follows that    lim 1 lim 1opt optp s w      . However, 
Molana et al. (2012) show that with homogenous productivity the optimal subsidy eliminates 
the mark-up margin ( 1)    and fully corrects the monopolistic distortion. Hence, 
lim 1opts    and lim optp w   . More generally, the extent to which the subsidy addresses this 
distortion is directly related to the size of , i.e. it is negatively related to the degree of 
heterogeneity between firms.  
   Intuitively, by reducing firms’ costs and making it easier for them to survive in equilibrium, 
the subsidy works towards increasing the mass of surviving firms.  As shown in Figure 1, the 
mass of entrants is concave in s, but reaches a maximum at some opts s , whilst the mass of 
varieties is monotonically increasing in s. However, an increase in s raises the tax, which in turn 
reduces labour supply and welfare. In addition, the lower average productivity in the industry 
contributes to offsetting the initial price-reducing effect of the subsidy. Taken together, these 
forces underpin the concavity of  .U s  
 In sum, by reducing the minimum productivity required to break-even in the industry, the 
wage subsidy triggers a reallocation of resources away from leisure and towards production, and 
away from the most and towards the least efficient firms. Despite the fact that the subsidy reduces 
the selectivity in the industry, the welfare maximising subsidy rate is positive and entails a higher 
level of employment.  
 
3.  A two-country setting  
In this section we extend the model to consider two symmetric countries (home and foreign), 
characterised by the same consumer preferences and technologies as in the autarkic model above. 
We shall denote the foreign country’s variables by an asterisk superscript and, given the assumed 
symmetry, focus our discussion on the home country.  
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 The CES consumption basket and its price index are now respectively given by 
             
* * * *
1 1
1 1/ 1
1 1/ 11 1/ 1* *, ,
x x
d x d x
i M i Mi M M i M M
Y y i di y i di P p i di p i di
      
    
                  
  (22) 
where the subscripts d and x refer to domestically consumed and exported varieties, respectively 
– thus, e.g., *xy  and 
*
xp  are the quantity and price of varieties exported by the foreign  country 
and consumed in the home country. The demand functions for the domestic and foreign varieties 
of the differentiated good are respectively given by 
         **, .d xd xp i p iy i Y y i YP P
           
  (23) 
 The possibility of trade implies that firms will have to decide after entry whether to produce 
for the domestic market only or to also export. In addition to the fixed entry cost e and the fixed 
cost d  required for the production of ,dy  an exporting firm also incurs a fixed cost x  (also 
in terms of labour) for producing and marketing the output xy  it sells abroad. Given the higher 
complexity of operating in foreign markets, it is plausible to assume .d x      
 As in the autarkic case, we shall assume that the government does not set firm-specific 
subsidies. However, the openness of the economy results in the possibility of broad categories 
of firms/activities to be targeted – e.g. consistent with pressures for some form of support to be 
directed to exporters during the recent recession.  Hence, we shall briefly examine an ‘export-
only’ wage subsidy, ,xs  for labour employed in the production for exports, and compare it with 
a ‘domestic-only’ wage subsidy, ,ds  for labour employed in production for domestic sales, in 
addition to focussing primarily on the ‘uniform’ wage subsidy case in which .d xs s s     
 A firm’s profits from its domestic and foreign sales are, respectively, given by 
                     1 , 1 ,d d d d d x x x x xp y s wl p y s wl                (24) 
where we have clearly distinguished between the two types of wage subsidy at this stage. The 
corresponding labour requirements are  
         , ,d xd d x xy yl l            (25) 
where it is assumed that varieties are traded at a per-unit iceberg trade cost 1.    Maximisation 
of (24) subject to (23) and (25) implies the following optimal price rules for a firm with 
productivity   serving both markets: 
        
 
 
1 1
, .
1 1
d x
d x
s w s w
p p
      
      (26) 
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3.1. General equilibrium  
The competitive selection process that follows entry will result in the emergence of two 
productivity cut-offs, ˆ ˆ and d x  , which respectively satisfy    ˆ ˆ0 and 0d d x x      and 
correspond to the minimum productivity required to operate in the domestic market and to 
export. For a given mass of entrants F, a mass   ˆ ˆ1 d dM G F F     of firms with 
productivity  ˆ ,d    will survive and produce for the domestic market. A subset of these, 
with mass   ˆ ˆ1x x xM G F F     and with productivity  ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,x x d       will also 
export to the foreign country. Following the same procedure as in autarky, for any given 
ˆ ˆ and d x   we obtain the corresponding average productivities: 
  
1/( 1) 1/( 1)
ˆ ˆ, .
1 1d d x x
        
              
    (27) 
 The free-entry condition, the labour market clearing condition, the balanced government 
budget constraint, and the trade balance are then respectively given by:   
      0,net d d x x xM M weF           (28) 
      1 ,d d x x xMl M l eF H        (29) 
       ,d d d x x x xw s Ml s M l T      (30) 
     * * * .x x x x x xM r M r     (31) 
 Using foreign labour as numeraire and setting * 1,w   the domestic wage w is also a measure 
of relative wages. Due to the complex nonlinearities involved, analytical equilibrium solutions 
cannot be derived; hence, we shall derive numerical solutions to explain the policy effects.12  It 
is nevertheless possible to obtain analytical relationships between the productivity cut-offs 
 * *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,d x d x     the relative wage w, and subsidy rates  * *, , ,x x d ds s s s  in general equilibrium. 
In particular, we find,    
   
 
 
1 1
* * * 111 1
1 1
* * *
1ˆ ˆ 1, ,
ˆ ˆ1 1
dd d d d d
x x x x x x
s w s
s s w

        
                         
  (32) 
which imply that – for any given fixed cost structure, trade cost, and initial relative wage – a 
change in wage subsidies by either or both countries triggers selection effects that will alter the 
productivity composition of the industry in both countries. As can be seen from (32), even when 
   * *, = , ,d x d x     the ratio between a country’s domestic productivity cut-off and its trading 
                                                 
12 Given that we shall only consider symmetric solutions in which the two countries are identical, we have based 
the initial solution on the values used in the autarkic case, i.e.  e 0.00035,   0.25,   0.5,   3.1,   3.8, and 
0.00025.d   In addition, we have set 0.0005x   and, initially, used   1.1.   
12 
 
partner’s export cut-off is not constant as in the standard Melitz model, but depends on the 
subsidies and on their effect on the relative wage. Specifically, in the symmetric equilibrium – 
in which countries are identical, * ,x x xs s s    *d d ds s s   and * 1w w   – (32) implies  
   
1
* 1 1
1
*
ˆ ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ 1
d d d d
x x x x
s
s

     
             
;  (33) 
thus, while the relative domestic to export productivity cut-offs are the same in both countries, 
they depend on the discrepancy between the ‘domestic’ and ‘export’ subsidies. An increase in 
the domestic wage subsidy relative to the export wage subsidy reduces the domestic relative to 
the export productivity cut-off , and reallocates resources away from more productive firms 
(exporters) towards less productive ones (non-exporters). However, with a ‘uniform’ symmetric 
subsidy policy, in which ,x ds s s   we obtain the familiar solution discussed in Melitz (2003), 
  
1
* 1
1
*
ˆ ˆ
,
ˆ ˆ
d d d
x x x
    
      
  (34)  
and the subsidy has no impact on the ratio between the domestic and export productivity cut-
offs.   
 
3.2. Optimal policy  
We first describe and compare the properties of equilibria under a uniform optimal subsidy 
policy and then explain how they change when subsidies are targeted to firms’ export or domestic 
production instead.  In all cases, we retain the assumption that the two countries are identical 
and set    * * * * * * * *, , , , , , , = , , , , , , , .d x d xe e                
 
3.2.1. Uniform wage subsidies  
Figure 2.1 shows how the home utility,  * , ,U s s  varies with the two countries’ uniform 
subsidies, where x ds s s   and * * *.x ds s s     In particular, for any given * * 0,s s     *,U s s   
is strictly concave in s and reaches a unique maximum at some (0,1].s  This ensures the 
existence of optimal policy and implies that each government has a unilateral incentive to set a 
positive wage subsidy. Furthermore, since  * *, 0U s s s    for any given 0,s s   a 
unilateral rise in wage subsidy in one country has a positive externality on its trading partner.    
 These results are robust and hinge on the selection effects of the subsidy induced by changes 
in the countries’ domestic and export productivity cut-offs. In particular, setting x ds s s   and 
* * 0x ds s   in (32), we obtain   
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       
1 1
1 1
* 1 * 11 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 , 1 ,d dd x d x
x x
s w s w
  
        
               
  (35) 
where  .w w s  As s is increased, *ˆ ˆd x   falls and *ˆ ˆd x   rises.13 It therefore becomes 
relatively easier for the home firms to survive in both domestic and export markets. The first 
column of Figure 3 illustrates, for * 0s  , the effects of a unilateral increases in the uniform wage 
subsidy on key variables. As is clear from the figure, *ˆx , ˆx  and ˆd  all fall in s while *ˆd  rises.  
Intuitively, by lowering labour costs, an increase in s reduces the selectivity in the industry, 
induces entry and results in greater product variety; the latter underpins a fall in the price index, 
despite the lower average industry productivity.  The ultimate effect is a higher aggregate output 
via a reallocation of time away from leisure and towards production.  Thus, the concavity of a 
country’s utility function with respect to its own subsidy stems from a trade-off between the 
combined effects of a lower price index, and the reduced leisure and the higher tax bill required 
to finance the increase in the subsidy for a larger mass of firms. 
 Since a unilateral increase in subsidy by the home country strengthens industry selectivity in 
the foreign country by raising *ˆd , it leads to a reduction in its mass of domestically produced 
varieties. Nevertheless, the foreign country too experiences a fall in its price level since the 
impacts on *P  of the rise in *d  and in xM  dominate that of the fall in *.M   As a result, a 
unilateral increase in subsidy by one country has a positive welfare externality on its trading 
partner.   
 The international externalities arising from a unilateral subsidy affect governments’ 
incentives to set policies strategically. In Figure 4.1 we have plotted the two governments’ 
reaction functions in the  *,s s  space (where the iso-utility contours are only shown for the 
home country). The reaction functions are downward sloping, indicating that the policies are 
strategic substitutes and  2 * *, 0U s s s s     and  2 * * *, 0U s s s s     hold. Thus, a unique 
and stable Nash equilibrium  * ,N Ns s  exists at the intersection of the reaction functions which, 
given the assumed symmetry, occurs on the 45o line from the origin, implying *N Ns s .   The 
cooperative solution  * ,C Cs s , obtained by maximising the joint utility function 
   * * *, ,U s s U s s , occurs when the relevant iso-utilities of the two countries are tangent to 
each other and to the 45o line.   Since the non-cooperative behaviour fails to internalise the 
positive externality of the subsidy, the Nash equilibrium entails under-subsidisation and is 
                                                 
13 This follows from the result, obtained in this and all subsequent unilateral wage subsidy policy cases examined 
below, that a unilateral increase in the wage subsidy by the home country stimulates a rise in its wage rate but 
reduces the wage net of subsidy, i.e. as s rises,  w s  increases but   1 s w  falls. 
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dominated by the cooperative solution. Thus, we obtain * * 0C C N Ns s s s     and  
           * * * * * * *, , , , 0,0 0,0C C C C N N N NU s s U s s U s s U s s U U     .  
 The equilibrium productivity cut-offs can be derived analytically for any symmetric solution. 
Specifically, we find that the export productivity cut-offs are 
      
1/
1
1
* 1
, ,
1ˆ ˆ 1 1 ,
1
x d d
x e x e e
x x
s
e

        


                        
  (36) 
where * es s s   and the subscript e=N,C denotes the Nash and cooperative solutions, 
respectively. Substituting these and * *d x d x es s s s s     into (32), we obtain the solution for 
the domestic productivity cut-offs, 
  
1
1
* 1
, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ .dd e d e x e
x
   
      
  (37) 
Thus, * * 0C C N Ns s s s     implies * *, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆx C x C x N x N       and * *, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .d C d C d N d N        That 
is, by correcting the under-subsidisation characterising the Nash equilibrium, the cooperative 
policy leads to lower export and domestic productivity cut-offs in both countries. This is 
consistent with the fact that a higher uniform subsidy reduces the selectivity of competition, 
making it easier to survive in the domestic market and to export.   
 Table 1 provides a comparison of the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions with the no-
policy benchmark solution. The effects of the policy on the cut-off productivity underpin the 
changes in the other key variables. In particular, both non-cooperative and cooperative policies 
result in a lager mass of surviving firms and in a lower price index (with both effects being more 
enhanced in the cooperative regime). This explains why, despite the lower average industry 
productivity, both employment and welfare increase as we move sequentially from the no-policy 
solution to the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. Table 1 also shows the role of the 
Pareto shape parameter. As in the autarkic case, a smaller value of   is associated with a smaller 
optimal subsidy, both in the Nash and cooperative equilibria, and results in a higher welfare.  
 
3.2.2. Targeted wage subsidies  
We now briefly examine whether subsidy policies lead to better welfare outcomes when they are 
targeted to exports or domestic production.  
 Figure 2.2 illustrates how the home utility varies with two countries’ ‘export-only’ wage 
subsidies, i.e., *xs  and xs  vary while 
* 0d ds s  .  For any given * * 0x xs s  , an increase in xs  
reduces the country’s utility, but this has a positive externality on the foreign country, i.e.: 
 *, 0x x xU s s s    and  * *, 0x x xU s s s   . Underpinning these results are the effects of the 
subsidy on the two countries’ productivity cut-offs.  Note that, in this case, (32) implies  
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    
1 1
1 1
* 1 * 11 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, 1d dd x d x x
x x
w s w
  
        
              
. (38) 
Thus, it follows that both *ˆ ˆd x   and *ˆ ˆd x   increase and we find * *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .d x d x     More 
specifically, as the second column of Figure 3 shows, while a unilateral increase in wage subsidy 
to the export operations of firms in the home country reduces the export cut-offs in both 
countries, thus increasing the intensive and extensive margins of exports, it increases their 
domestic cut-offs. Hence, both countries experience a reallocation of resources towards more 
efficient (exporting) firms, resulting in a reduction in the total mass of firms and an increase in 
the mass of exporters. However, since *ˆ ˆd d    (albeit very slightly initially) and *ˆ ˆx x  , M 
falls by more than does *M , whereas xM   rises more than does 
*.xM  As a result, P increases 
whilst *P  falls. These changes in the price index are reflected in the utilities: whilst a unilateral 
export-only wage subsidy reduces the home country’s welfare, it raises welfare in the foreign 
country.   
 Since in the export-only subsidy case the unilateral policy deteriorates the country’s welfare, 
‘no subsidy’ turns out to be the strictly dominant strategy when both governments are policy 
active.  This can be seen in Figure 4.2 where the home and foreign reaction functions respectively 
overlap the horizontal and vertical axes in the  * ,x xs s  space and the origin constitutes a stable 
Nash equilibrium,  *, ,, 0.x N x Ns s   However, as in the uniform subsidy case, the non-cooperative 
behaviour fails to internalise the positive international externality and the Nash solution is 
dominated by the cooperative solution which entails positive subsidies:  *, ,, 0.x C x Cs s    
 The equilibrium solutions for the export productivity cut-offs are  
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                                        
  (39) 
The domestic productivity cut-offs can then be obtained by substituting these and 
* *
,0,d d x x x es s s s s     into (32), which can be shown to imply 
     1, , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1d N d C x C x N x Cs      .  (40) 
 Given that * *, , , , 0x C x C x N x Ns s s s    , (39) implies * *, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .x C x C x N x N        This is 
consistent with the fact that the unilateral export-only policy reduces the export productivity cut-
offs. However, ,x Cs  ought to be sufficiently high for , ,ˆ ˆd C d N   and , ,ˆ ˆx C x N   to hold 
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simultaneously, as required (see Table 2 for the numerical solutions). Thus, by correcting the 
under-subsidisation that characterises the Nash solution, the cooperative policy in this case raises 
the average industry productivity whilst reducing the productivity cut-off of exporters: it 
becomes tougher for the entrants to survive in the industry but once they do so they find it easier 
to export. As a result, the mass of varieties will be smaller but a larger subset will be exported. 
These changes are sufficient to reduce the price index to an extent that raises employment and 
welfare.  
 A ‘domestic-only’ wage subsidy involves using ds   and *ds   as policy instruments whilst 
setting * 0x xs s  .  The home country’s utility is plotted against ds   and *ds  in Figure 2.3. While 
in this case a country has an incentive to raise its subsidy unilaterally, in contrast to the uniform 
subsidy case, the unilateral policy entails negative international externalities and the two 
governments’ reaction functions, shown in Figure 4.3, are upward sloping. In this case, (32) 
implies  
    
1 1
1 1
* 1 * 1 11ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 ,d dd x d d x
x x
s w w
 
       
              
. (41) 
Starting from a given solution value for w, an increase in ds  reduces both *ˆ ˆd x   and *ˆ ˆd x  , 
with * *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .d x d x       As the last column of Figure 3 shows, with * 0ds  , as ds  increases, ˆd  
and *ˆd   fall whilst ˆx  and *ˆx  rise.  However, the fall in ˆd  and the rise in ˆx  exceed the 
reduction in *ˆd   and the increase in *ˆx , respectively. It then follows that, as a result of a much 
higher growth in the mass of firms in the home country, P falls whereas *P  rises, and this drives 
the effects of the policy on employment and welfare.  
 Figure 4.3 shows that when both governments are policy active, the non-cooperative policy 
leads to a unique and stable Nash equilibrium in domestic-only wage subsidies * , , 0.d N d Ns s    
The failure to internalise the negative international externalities, however, implies that the Nash 
equilibrium in this case entails over-subsidisation relative to the cooperative solution which 
maximises joint welfare, i.e. * *, , , ,0 .d C d C d N d Ns s s s     The equilibrium export productivity 
cut-offs are given by    
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                                       
  (42) 
 
which, together with * 0x xs s   and * ,d d d es s s  , can be substituted into (32) to obtain  
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       1, , , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1d N d C d N d C x N x Cs s         . (43) 
Given that * *, , , ,d C d C d N d Ns s s s   , (42) implies * *, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆx C x C x N x N       which is consistent 
with the fact that a smaller unilateral domestic-only subsidy stimulates a smaller rise in the export 
productivity cut-offs. However, ,d Cs  should be sufficiently smaller than ,d Ns  so as to ensure 
, ,ˆ ˆd C d N   and , ,ˆ ˆx C x N   hold simultaneously (see Table 2 for the numerical solutions). Thus, 
by correcting the over-subsidisation characterising the Nash solution, the cooperative policy 
reduces the export productivity cut-offs but increases their domestic counterparts. These effects 
result in a relatively smaller mass of varieties, a larger subset of which will be exported. Although 
in this case the cooperative solution entails a relatively higher price index and a lower level of 
output, the resulting higher leisure and lower taxation are sufficient to raise welfare above the 
corresponding Nash level.  
 In sum, our results suggest that a uniform subsidy leads to higher levels of employment and 
welfare under both the non-cooperative and cooperative cases and dominates both an ‘export 
promotion’ and an ‘import substitution’ policy whereby subsidies are selectively targeted to the 
export or to the domestic operations of firms (Table 2 reports the equilibrium solution values of 
key endogenous variables under the different policy regimes).   
 
3.2.3. Trade liberalisation 
As is well established in the literature, in this type of models a reduction in trade costs typically 
reallocates resources towards more efficient firms via a reduction in the export productivity cut-
off and an increase in the domestic one.  Figure 5 illustrates the effects of changes in the iceberg 
trade cost on the optimal unilateral policy when the home country uses a uniform wage subsidy 
and the foreign country is not policy active (i.e. for 0d xs s s     and * * 0d xs s  ). As can be 
seen from the figure, the optimum value of wage subsidy is lower the smaller is the trade cost; 
hence, trade liberalisation would result in a reduction in the optimum level of subsidy.  
Intuitively, for a given s, as  falls the selectivity in the industry and average productivity 
increase. This improves the marginal effectiveness of the wage subsidy, and hence reduces its 
optimum value.  As shown in Figure 5, while the lowering of the trade cost reduces the optimum 
subsidy, it raises the corresponding value of utility.  
 When both countries are policy active, trade liberalisation can be shown to enhance the degree 
of under-subsidisation relative to the cooperative solution. This is because whilst the subsidy 
corresponding to the symmetric Nash equilibrium falls as the iceberg trade cost reduces, the 
optimal policy in the symmetric cooperative case is unaffected by trade costs (see the relevant 
columns of Table 1 for numerical solutions).  To see this, note that in general the symmetric 
cooperative equilibrium solution is similar to the autarkic solution. That is, when 
* * *,d x d xs s s s s s     and    * * * * * * * *, , , , , , , = , , , , , , , ,d x d xe e               we obtain 
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   * * *, ; , ;U s s U s s   which, after imposing *s s  can be written as      ;U s U s     
where  U s  is the corresponding autarkic solution for the utility and     is a monotonically 
decreasing function with    0, 1 1 and 1.         Hence, the optimal cooperative subsidy 
corresponds to the autarkic one, i.e. the value of *s s  which maximises  *, ;U s s   also 
maximises  .U s   
 
4. Targeting entry instead of employment: a comparison 
Given the role of entry in facilitating reallocations towards more efficient producers, the 
reduction of entry barriers is normally seen as an effective means to increasing aggregate 
productivity and employment.  To this end, governments implement policies (ranging from the 
simplification of red tape procedures to start-up grants) to support entrepreneurship and facilitate 
the setting up of new firms.  In this section, therefore, we examine the effects of an entry subsidy 
and compare them to those of a uniform wage subsidy discussed above.   
 Starting from the autarkic model developed in Section 2, we replace the wage subsidy with 
an ad-valorem entry subsidy, denoted by , which is assumed to be proportional to a firm’s entry 
cost e and financed by lump-sum income taxation as before.  Accordingly, the household and 
government budget constraints are modified as   netPY w E L T     and ,wE T   and 
entry continues until     1 0.net M wE         Recalling that  E eF  and  1,w  we 
now obtain      
1/
1ˆ ,
1 1e
     
       
      
1 1/
1 1
,
1 1 1e
        
               
   
1 ,
1
l    
      
  
1
r   
     
  and 1
1
   
     
  which show that the entry 
subsidy only affects the marginal and average productivities, which are increasing in . 
Therefore, contrary to a wage subsidy, an entry subsidy makes it more difficult for an entrant to 
survive and hence increases the selectivity in the industry; this effect is stronger the higher is the 
degree of heterogeneity among firms (i.e., the lower is  ).   
 In this case too, the solution for the utility function,   ,U   can be shown to be strictly 
concave in .  However, as shown in Figure 6, the optimum value of entry subsidy, ,opt  exceeds 
that of the uniform wage subsidy ,opts  but results in a smaller rise in welfare, i.e. opt opts   but 
   .opt optU U s   This is because, compared to a wage subsidy, a rise in entry subsidy 
stimulates a relatively smaller increase in the mass of surviving firms which leads to a smaller 
reduction in the price level.  More generally, a wage subsidy offers a more direct way, than an 
entry subsidy, to tackle the monopolistic distortion reflected in the difference between the 
marginal rates of substitution and transformation between the monopolistic good and leisure; as 
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can be seen from Figure 6, starting from 0,s    employment responds to a rise in s more than 
it does to an increase in .  
 Moving to the two-country setting, the home country’s utility is plotted against the two 
countries’ entry subsidies in Figure 2.4 and can be seen to be concave in  and increasing in *.v   
Hence, each country has an incentive to engage in unilateral optimal policy, and an increase in 
subsidy by a country has a positive externality on its trading partner. The two governments’ 
reaction functions are illustrated in Figure 4.4: when both countries are policy active, the entry 
subsidies are strategic substitutes and a unique and stable Nash equilibrium is attainable at 
* 0.N N    This is consistent with the findings in Pflüger and Suedekum (2013)14. Table 2 
reports the equilibrium solution values of key endogenous variables under the different policy 
regimes using the entry subsidy.  Intuitively, when a country unilaterally raises its entry subsidy, 
it experiences a relatively large increase in the mass of its entrants. As a result, both domestic 
and export productivity cut-offs rise and so does the mass of surviving firms and exporters, i.e. 
ˆ ,d   ˆ ,x  M and xM  all increase.  In the foreign country, *ˆd  rises and *ˆx  falls, leading to a 
reduction in *M  and a rise in *.xM    However, both countries enjoy a higher welfare, stimulated 
by a sufficiently large drop in their price indices. These welfare effects explain why both 
countries have an incentive to subsidise entry. The Nash equilibrium is characterised by both an 
increase in domestic and export productivity cut-offs and an increase in the mass of firms. The 
higher average industry productivity and the greater product variety result in higher welfare 
despite the lower leisure time and the higher tax. By failing to fully internalise the positive 
externality, however, the Nash equilibrium is characterised by under subsidisation: as is 
illustrated in Figure 4.4., the entry subsidy is higher in the cooperative than in the Nash 
equilibrium, i.e. * * .C C N N         
 Thus, as shown in Table 2, both entry and uniform wage subsidies raise welfare and the level 
of employment via an increase in the mass of varieties and a lower price index. The underlying 
mechanisms are, however, different: the entry subsidy has a direct effect on entry and results in 
an increase of the selectivity (and hence of the average productivity) of the industry. Instead, the 
wage subsidy enables a higher survival rate by reducing the minimum (and hence average) 
industry productivity. However, despite raising the industry average productivity, the entry 
subsidy is less effective than the wage subsidy in raising employment, output and welfare. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Pflüger and Suedekum (2013) examine the role of entry subsidy but in their model the mass of firms is not affected 
in autarky. The difference between their results and ours mainly hinges on their assumptions of (i) an exogenously 
fixed labour supply, (ii) an additional, competitively produced, homogenous consumption good instead of leisure 
as a substitute for the CES basket of differentiated good, and (iii) a quasi-linear utility function which renders the 
expenditure on the differentiated good constant.   
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5.  Conclusions 
Wage subsidies are an important component of active labour market polices and their use by 
governments has increased in recent years in an attempt to sustain employment. This paper has 
studied how competitive selection forces affect international policy spillovers and the nature of 
optimal subsidy policy. Specifically, we have shown that intra-industry competitive selection is 
an important channel in the transmission of the effects of wage subsidies on aggregate 
employment and average industry productivity. A notable result is that whilst a wage subsidy 
applied uniformly to all firms reduces the strength of the selection forces within the industry and 
hence lowers the marginal and average industry productivities, it increases employment and 
welfare by stimulating entry, thus contributing to the correction of the monopolistic market 
distortion.  
 In a two-country setting, the unilateral incentive of governments to use such uniform subsidies 
results in international spillovers consisting of both selection and fiscal externalities. Positive 
welfare effects on a country’s trading partner imply that the non-cooperative behaviour entails 
under-subsidisation from a global welfare point of view. Targeted subsidies – to either the export 
or the domestic operation of firms – do not dominate the uniform subsidy from either a non-
cooperative or a joint welfare policy point of view. A reduction in trade costs – by triggering 
entry and increasing the average productivity of the industry – reduces the size of optimal 
uniform wage subsidy. Crucially, despite strengthening selection forces and increasing average 
industry productivity, an entry subsidy is less effective in increasing employment and welfare 
than a wage subsidy since it offers a less direct way to tackle the monopolistic distortion than 
the latter.  
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Figure 1. The autarkic model: effects of wage subsidy and the role of firm heterogeneity 
Response of solutions to a rise in subsidy 
   
   
Response of optimal solutions to a change in Pareto shape parameter,  
   
   
 The utility functions (the top left corner figure) are plotted over a smaller subsidy range to highlight the maximum.   
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Figure 2. The two-country model: response of welfare to changes in subsidy  
 
Figure 2.1. Home utility with uniform wage subsidy  
 * * * *, : 0 & 0x d x dU s s s s s s s s       
 
Figure 2.2. Home utility  with export-only wage subsidy 
 * * *0; , : 0 & 0d d x x x xs s U s s s s     
  
 
Figure 2.3. Home utility  with domestic-only wage subsidy 
 * * *0; , : 0 & 0x x d d d ds s U s s s s     
 
Figure 2.4. Home utility  with entry subsidy 
 * * * *0; , : 0 & 0x d x ds s s s U           
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Figure 3. The two-country model:  effects of unilateral wage subsidy policy by the home country 
(home and foreign variables respectively are depicted in solid and broken lines)   
uniform subsidy 
* * 0, 0x d x ds s s s s      
export-only subsidy 
* * 0, 0x d d xs s s s     
domestic-only subsidy 
* * 0, 0d x x ds s s s     
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Figure 3 continued     
uniform subsidy 
* * 0, 0x d x ds s s s s      
export-only subsidy 
* * 0, 0x d d xs s s s     
domestic-only subsidy 
* * 0, 0d x x ds s s s     
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Figure 4. The two-country model: policy reaction functions and Nash and cooperative solutions 
 
Figure 4.1. Uniform wage subsidy  
* * *0 & 0x d x ds s s s s s       
 
Figure 4.2. Export-only wage subsidy 
* *0, 0 & 0d d x xs s s s     
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Figure 5.  The two-country model: response of optimal unilateral policy solutions to trade cost 
(uniform wage subsidy: * * 0, 0optd x d xs s s s s     ) 
  
  
 
Figure 6. The autarkic model: entry subsidy (broken) versus wage subsidy (solid) 
   
   
   
 The utility functions (the top left corner figure) are plotted over a smaller subsidy range to highlight the maximum.   
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Table 1.  Comparing the equilibrium solutions of the model for different cases with uniform wage subsidy 
 V
a
ria
b
les 
Autarkic Cases Two-Country Cases 
No Policy 
Benchmark 
Optimal 
Policy 
No Policy (Benchmark) Cooperative Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium 
Initial Case 
= 3.1 
= 1.1 
 falls by 5%
= 2.945 
= 1.1
 falls by 5%
= 3.1 
= 1.045
Initial Case 
= 3.1 
= 1.1 
 falls by 5%
= 2.945 
= 1.1
 falls by 5%
= 3.1 
= 1.045
Initial Case 
= 3.1 
= 1.1 
 falls by 5%
= 2.945 
= 1.1
 falls by 5%
= 3.1 
= 1.045
s 0.00000 0.04000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.27000 0.24000 0.27000 0.21500 0.18000 0.20500 
T 0.00000 0.00982 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.13427 0.14054 0.13711 0.09736 0.09915 0.09360 
ˆ
d   1.84407 1.81994 2.18457 2.93559 2.23305 1.97368 2.67439 2.01748 2.02047 2.74430 2.07377 
ˆ
x  -- -- 3.07800 4.13618 2.98900 2.78086 3.76815 2.70045 2.84679 3.86664 2.77579 
F 183.950 209.863 243.662 425.887 258.666 323.416 424.292 330.248 316.696 430.615 323.380 
M 27.593 32.791 21.615 17.862 21.436 39.301 23.415 37.491 35.788 22.025 33.710 
xM  -- -- 7.46715 6.50741 8.68176 13.57703 8.53033 15.18400 12.36346 8.02397 13.65253 
P 0.09774 0.08939 0.07462 0.04633 0.07146 0.04870 0.03509 0.04729 0.05290 0.03771 0.05204 
dp  0.31961 0.31089 0.26979 0.15772 0.26394 0.21799 0.13157 0.21326 0.22899 0.13835 0.22595 
xp  -- -- 0.21063 0.12313 0.20606 0.17019 0.10272 0.16649 0.17877 0.10801 0.17640 
Y 2.11269 2.63543 4.80821 12.85869 5.33012 9.77858 16.91485 10.28330 8.81584 15.97371 9.14995 
H 0.72913 0.68116 0.64121 0.40424 0.61911 0.38950 0.26593 0.37660 0.43630 0.29848 0.43022 
L 0.20648 0.24539 0.27351 0.44670 0.29035 0.49731 0.58556 0.50781 0.45286 0.55081 0.45660 
dMl  0.20648 0.24539 0.16175 0.25841 0.16042 0.29410 0.33874 0.28056 0.26782 0.31864 0.25226 
x xM l  -- -- 0.11176 0.18829 0.12994 0.20320 0.24682 0.22725 0.18504 0.23217 0.20433 
U 14.7124 14.7198 15.9351 18.2688 16.0813 16.4184 18.5950 16.5510 16.3950 18.5718 16.5211 
 The difference in the initial solutions between the autarky case (in the first column) and the two country case (in the third column) is mainly due to the existence of trade 
which raises productivity, economic activity and utility.   
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Figures and Tables 
 
8 
 
Table 2.  The two-country model: comparing solutions obtained under different policies with alternative subsidies 
Policy Subsidy Type s or  T ˆd  ˆx  F M xM  w P dp  xp  Y 1H U 
Initial 
Solution 
No Subsidy 0.0000 0.0000 2.1846 3.0780 243.6620 21.6150 7.4672 1.0000 0.0746 0.2698 0.2106 4.8082 0.3588 15.9351 
U
n
ila
tera
l O
p
tim
a
l 
P
o
licy
 S
o
lu
tio
n
s 
Domestic 
only 
Home: 0.2650 0.1116 1.8195 3.6855 310.2967 48.5223 5.4403 1.1600 0.0628 0.2762 0.2041 8.4434 0.5531 16.2929 
Foreign: 0.0000 0.0000 2.1385 3.1830 228.4956 21.6528 6.3108 1.0000 0.0780 0.2756 0.2037 4.3138 0.3365 15.7971 
Export 
only 
Home: 0.0000 0.0000 2.1846 3.0780 243.6622 21.6150 7.4672 1.0000 0.0746 0.2698 0.2106 4.8082 0.3588 15.9351 
Foreign: 0.0000 0.0000 2.1846 3.0780 243.6622 21.6150 7.4672 1.0000 0.0746 0.2698 0.2106 4.8082 0.3588 15.9351 
Uniform 
Home: 0.2350 0.1315 1.9352 2.9920 306.9855 39.6498 10.2717 1.2419 0.0670 0.2893 0.2059 8.3831 0.5579 16.2058 
Foreign: 0.0000 0.0000 2.2765 2.9231 271.3352 21.1831 9.7586 1.0000 0.0689 0.2589 0.2218 5.7981 0.3995 16.2129 
Entry 
Home: 0.3050 0.0467 2.4131 3.5587 398.3682 25.9591 7.7854 1.0970 0.0708 0.2679 0.1999 6.3167 0.4502 16.0592 
Foreign: 0.0000 0.0000 2.2274 2.9984 256.9679 21.4634 8.5409 1.0000 0.0718 0.2646 0.2162 5.2693 0.3784 16.0642 
N
a
sh
 
 S
o
lu
tio
n
s 
Domestic only 0.2700 0.1008 1.7912 3.8685 304.0254 49.9042 4.5869 1.0000 0.0549 0.2402 0.1676 8.1604 0.5485 16.1762 
Export only 0.0000 0.0000 2.1846 3.0780 243.6622 21.6150 7.4672 1.0000 0.0746 0.2698 0.2106 4.8082 0.3588 15.9351 
Uniform 0.2150 0.0974 2.0205 2.8468 316.6960 35.7882 12.3635 1.0000 0.0529 0.2290 0.1788 8.8158 0.5637 16.3950 
Entry 0.2850 0.0396 2.4342 3.4298 397.2314 25.1952 8.7040 1.0000 0.0634 0.2421 0.1890 6.5965 0.4578 16.1599 
C
o
o
p
era
tiv
e 
S
o
lu
tio
n
s 
Domestic only 0.2200 0.0719 1.8576 3.6669 297.7960 43.6687 5.3039 1.0000 0.0583 0.2475 0.1768 7.5207 0.5104 16.1966 
Export only 0.2050 0.0485 2.4596 2.5383 283.6573 17.4236 15.8019 1.0000 0.0628 0.2396 0.2031 6.6536 0.4662 16.1132 
Uniform 0.2700 0.1343 1.9737 2.7809 323.4155 39.3012 13.5770 1.0000 0.0487 0.2180 0.1702 9.7786 0.6105 16.4184 
Entry 0.3550 0.0561 2.5165 3.5457 451.2621 25.8200 8.9198 1.0000 0.0608 0.2342 0.1828 7.0500 0.4847 16.1732 
 
 In the last but one column, 1  H is the total employment. “Domestic only”, “Export only” and “Uniform” refer to wage subsidies.  
 “Unilateral Optimal Policy Solutions” refer to the cases in which the home country acts unilaterally while the foreign country remains policy inactive.  Since these solutions are 
asymmetric, we report the solutions for both home and foreign countries to highlight the policy externality effect.   
 Note that since no subsidy is the dominant strategy in the Nash solution for the ‘Export only’ case, the rows for this case in Nash Solutions and Unilateral Optimal Policy Solutions 
are identical to the “Initial Solution” with ‘No Subsidy’ reported in the first row.  
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Additional appendices for online publication  
 
This document provides the following items as further information for the benefit of the 
referees: 
 
 Appendix 1 reproduces Figure 1 in the paper for a wider range of variables. 
 Appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respetively contain Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and 
Figure 3.3 that correspond to but expand the three columns referring to the 
uniform, export-only and domestic-only wage subsidy cases presented in 
Figure 3 in the paper. 
 Appendix 3 provides the figures that show how the joint utility responds to 
changes in subsidy. Thus, whilst Figures 2.1-2.4 in the paper illustrate the 
noncoperative behaviour, these figures show the case of cooperative 
behaviour.   
 Appendix 4 provides the definition of the variables and parameters and the 
corresponding notation used in (i) the autarkic version of the model in Section 
2, and (ii) the two-country model in Section 3.  
 Appendix 5 outlines the two-country model set up and obtains the general 
form of equations that can yield a closed form solution. It also gives the 
analytical derivation of the results used in the wage subsidy part of the paper.   
 Appendix 6 explains the set up of the model with entry subsidy.  
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Figure 1. The autarkic model: effects of wage subsidy and the role of firm heterogeneity 
Response of solutions to a rise in subsidy 
   
   
   
Response of optimal solutions to a rise firms’ homogeneity index 
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Figure 3.1. The two-country model:  effects of unilateral wage subsidy policy by the home country 
(uniform wage subsidy case; home and foreign variables respectively are depicted in solid and broken lines) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
  
Appendix 2.2: Expanded version of column 2 of Figure 3 in the paper  
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Figure 3.2. The two-country model:  effects of unilateral wage subsidy policy by the home country 
(export-only wage subsidy case; home and foreign variables respectively are depicted in solid and broken lines) 
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Figure 3.3. The two-country model:  effects of unilateral wage subsidy policy by the home country 
(domestic-only wage subsidy case; home and foreign variables respectively are depicted in solid and broken lines) 
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The two-country model: response of joint welfare to changes in subsidy 
Joint utility    * * *, , ,U s s U s s  with uniform 
wage subsidy 
* * *0 & 0x d x ds s s s s s       
Joint utility     * * *, , ,x x x xU s s U s s with export-only  
wage subsidy 
* *0, 0 & 0d d x xs s s s     
  
 
Joint utility    * * *, , ,d d d dU s s U s s with domestic-only 
wage subsidy 
* *0, 0 & 0x x d ds s s s     
 
Joint utility    * * *, , ,U U     with  
entry subsidy 
* * *0 & 0, 0x d x ds s s s         
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The table below provides the definition of the variables and parameters and the corresponding 
notation used in (i) the autarkic version of the model in Section 2, and (ii) the two-country model 
in Section 3 for the home country. The foreign country’s variables and parameters in the paper 
are distinguished by an asterisk superscript added to the corresponding home country’s variables 
and parameters. 
 
Description Notation   
Fixed cost of production of a variety (closed economy) 
Fixed cost of production of a variety (domestic & export)  &d x     
Coefficient of relative risk aversion for consumption in the utility function  
Coefficient of relative risk aversion for leisure in the utility function 
Scale coefficient of leisure in the utility function 
Productivity distribution: the shape parameter in the Pareto distribution 
Firm-level productivity     
Productivity cut-off for marginal firms (closed economy) ˆ 
Productivity cut-offs for marginal firms (non-exporting & exporting) ˆ & ˆxd     
Average productivity (closed economy)   
Average productivity (non-exporting & exporting) & xd       
CES elasticity of substitution 
Firm-level profit (closed economy)  
Firm-level profit (domestic & export) &d x    
Net aggregate profit of entry net 
Iceberg trade cost of exporting a variety   
Mass of entrants F 
Time required per entry  e 
Total time allocated to entry  E 
Labour requirement for producing a variety (closed economy)    l 
Labour requirement for producing a variety (domestic & export) &d xl l   
Time allocated to leisure  H 
Time allocated to work for firms L 
Mass of varieties M 
Mass of varieties (exports) xM    
CES price index  P 
Firm-level price (closed economy) p    
Firm-level price (non-exporting & exporting) &d xp p         
Firm-level revenue (domestic sales & exports)   r 
Firm-level price revenue (domestic sales & exports) &d xr r       
Wage subsidy received by a firm (closed economy and uniform subsidy in open economy) s 
Wage Labour subsidy received by a firm (domestic & export) &d xs s      
Entry subsidy 
Tax  T 
Wage rate w 
Demand for a variety (closed economy)   y 
Domestic for a variety (domestic sales & exports) &d xy y    
CES consumption basket Y 
Utility  U 
 
  
 Appendix 5: The reduced form two-country model equations with 
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In this appendix we outline the two-country model set up with (i) the two types of wage subsidy, 
ds  and xs  for labour used in production of domestic and exported varieties which we have used 
in Sections 3, and (ii) the entry subsidy   which we have analysed in Sections 4.  We only provide 
the details of the home country’s equations. However, given the symmetric nature of the model, 
it is straightforward to deduce the equations for the foreign country. To simplify notation, we use 
the following convention: let z be a firm-level variable which depends of the firm’s productivity 
level   ( i.e.  j jz z   with subscript ,j d x ) refer to domestic and export production. For 
firms with marginal and average productivity we respectively use  ˆˆ j jz z   and  .j jz z   
Table of equations 
No Description Equation for the home country  
(Eq.1) Household’s utility function 
1 1
, 0 1, 0
1 1
Y H
U
 
  
 
 
     
 
 
(Eq.2) Household’s time constraint  1L E H    
(Eq.3) 
Household’s budget 
constraint  
  netPY w L E T     
(Eq.4) FOC for utility maximisation 
Y w
H P



  
(Eq.5) Productivity distribution       (1 )1 and   , 1,G g              
(Eq.6) 
Mass of varieties (mass of 
surviving firms) 
    ˆ ˆ ˆ1 , ,d d dM G F M F          
(Eq.7) Mass of varieties exported 
    ˆ ˆ ˆ1 , ,x x x x xM G F M F            
 
(Eq.8) 
Average productivity cut-offs 
(proportional to marginal 
firms’ cut-offs)  
1 1ˆ
1
d d
  
 
    
  
,   
1 1ˆ
1
x x
  
 
    
  
 
(Eq.9) 
Productivity distribution of 
the surviving firms 
 
 
 ˆ1d d
g
G

 



,   
 
 ˆ1x x
g
G

 



 
(Eq.10) CES  consumption basket    
 
   
*
1
1 1/
1 1/ 1 1/* * *
ˆ , ˆ ,d x
d d x x xY M y d M y d

 
   
       

 
   

 
  
 
 
   
(Eq.11) CES price index     
 
   
*
1
1
1 1* * *
ˆ , ˆ ,d x
d d x x xP M p d M p d

 
   
       

 
   

 
  
 
 
   
(Eq.12) 
Demand for a variey 
(domestic sales)  
( )
ˆ( ) , ,dd d
p
y Y
P


  

 
   
 
 
(Eq.13) 
Demand for a variey 
(exports) 
*
* *( ) ˆ( ) , ,xx x
p
y Y
P


  

 
    
 
 
  
(Eq.14) 
Firm-level labour 
requirement (production for 
domestic sales) 
 
 
 ˆ, ,dd d d
y
l

   

     
(Eq.15) 
Firm-level profit and revenue 
(domestic sales) 
       
       
1 ,
ˆ; ,
d d d d
d d d d
r s wl
r p y
   
    
  
  
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Table of equations (continued) 
No Description Equation for the home country  
(Eq.16) 
Firm-level price (domestic 
sales) 
 
 
 
 
1
ˆ, ,
1
d
d d
s w
p

  
 

  

    
(Eq.17) 
Firm-level labour 
requirement (exports) 
 
 
 ˆ, ,xx x x
y
l
 
   

     
(Eq.18) 
Firm-level profit and revenue 
(exports) 
       
       
1 ,
ˆ; ,
x x x x
x x x x
r s wl
r p y
   
    
  
  
 
(Eq.19) Firm-level price (exports)  
 
 
 
1
ˆ, ,
1
x
x x
s w
p
 
  
 

  

 
(Eq.20) Aggregating domestic price    
 
 
1 1
,d
d d d dM p d Mp
 
 
    
 
 
  
(Eq.21) Aggregating imported price    

 
*
11* * * * * *
,x
x x x x x xM p d M p

 
    

 

  
(Eq.22) CES price index      
1
11 1* * *
d d x x xP Mp M p
 
 
 
   
(Eq.23) 
Aggregating revenue from 
domestic sales  
   
 
 
,d
d d d dM r d Mr
 
    
 
  
(Eq.24) 
Aggregating revenue from 
exports   
   
 
 
,x
x x x x x xM r d M r
 
    
 
  
(Eq.25) 
Aggregating profit from 
domestic sales  
   
 
 
,d
d d d dM d M
 
      
 
  
(Eq.26) 
Firm-level profit (domestic 
sales, firms with average 
productivity) 
 
 
 1d dd d d d d
r
s w

   

     
(Eq.27) 
Aggregating profit from 
exports  
   
 
 
,x
x x x x x xM d M
 
      
 
  
(Eq.28) 
Firm-level profit (exports, 
firms with average 
productivity) 
 
 
 1x xx x x x x
r
s w

   

     
(Eq.29) 
Labour demand (production 
for domestic sales)  
   
 
 
,d
d d d dM l d Ml
 
    
 
  
(Eq.30) 
Labour demand (production 
for exports) 
   
 
 
,x
x x x x x xM l d M l
 
    
 
  
 
 
Using the above and the equilibrium conditions in equations (28)-(31) in the paper, we obtain the 
full model. From (Eq.14)-(Eq.16) in the above table we obtain  1d d d dr s w     ;  (Eq.17)-
(Eq.19) in the same way yield  1x x x xr s w     .  Then, the domestic and export zero profit 
condition in home and foreign country imply 
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   ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1d d d d dr s w           (A4.1) 
   * * * * * *ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1d d d d dr s w          , (A4.1*) 
   ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1x x x x xr s w          , (A4.2) 
   * * * * * *ˆ ˆ0 1x x x x xr s w          . (A4.2*) 
 The conditions that entry continues until the net aggregate profit of entry is wiped out, given 
that  1net d x xM M v weF       and  * * * * * * * * *1net d x xM M w e F       , imply  
   1d x xM M weF      ,         (A4.3) 
   * * * * * * * *1d x xM M w e F      (A4.3*) 
 The government budget constraints for the home and foreign country are  
   d d x x xw s Ml s M l weF T    , (A4.4) 
   * * * * * * * * * *d d x x xw s M l s M l v w e F T   . (A4.4*) 
 The labour market equilibrium conditions are  
  1d x xMl M l eF H     ,         (A4.5) 
  * * * * * * * 1d x xM l M l e F H    . (A4.5
*) 
 The first order conditions for utility maximisation requir 
   Y w P H   , (A4.6)     
   
* ** * * * *Y w P H  . (A4.6*) 
 The CES price indices are 
      
1
11 1* *
d x xP M p M p
  
   , (A4.7) 
      
1
1 1 1* * *
d x xP M p M p
    
  . (A4.7*) 
 The final equation is the trade balance which requires1 
  * *
x x x xM r M r . (A4.8) 
Setting * 0    and eliminating , , , , , , , , , ,d x d x d x d x d xp p y y l l r r   , ,d x  M and xM  by relevant 
substitutions, the model is written as the following 15 equations which determine 
 * * * * * * *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,d x d x P P F F H H Y Y T T w    . Whilst 
*w  appears explicitly in these 
equations to highlight their symmetric form, we note that using the foreign labour as the 
numerraire renders its price exogenous and the normalisation * 1w   can be imposed.  
                                                 
1 Note that we have excluded the good market equilibrium conditions, 
* * * * * * and ,d x x d x xMr M r PY M r M r P Y     
and the household budget constraints,    * * * * * * * * and d x x d x xPY w Ml M l T P Y w M l M l T      , since they 
should now hold; a consistency check is to obtained them from (A4.3) to (A4.9).  
 Appendix 5 (continued) 
 
11 
 
  
 
 
1
11
ˆ
1
d
d d
s wY
P
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
    
 (A5.1) 
  
 
 
* * 1*
1
* *
*
1
ˆ
1
d
d d
s wY
P


 
 
 


    
          
 (A5.1*) 
  
 
 
1*
1 1
*
1
ˆ
1
x
x x
s wY
P
 
    
 
 
         
   
 (A5.2) 
  
 
 
* * 1
1
* * 1
1
ˆ
1
x
x x
s wY
P


    
 




    
           
 (A5.2*)  
       
1
ˆ ˆ1 1
1
d d d x x xs s e
   
   

    
     
 
  (A5.3) 
       * * * * * * *
1
ˆ ˆ1 1
1
d d d x x xs s e
   
   

    
     
 
 (A5.3*) 
     
1
ˆ ˆ 0
1
d d d x x x
T
s s
wF
   
   
 
    
   
  
 (A5.4) 
     
*
* * * * * *
* *
1
ˆ ˆ 0
1
d d d x x x
T
s s
w F
   
   
 
    
   
  
 (A5.4*) 
     
 11
ˆ ˆ 0
1
d d x x
eF H
F
   
   
 
     
   
  
 (A5.5) 
     
 * * *
* * * *
*
11
0
1
d d x x
e F H
F
   
   
 
     
   
  
 (A5.5*) 
  
 
1/ /
1/
Y
H
w P
  


  (A5.6)     
  
   
 
* * *
*
1/ /
* *
*
1/
* *
Y
H
w P
  


  (A5.6*) 
         * * * * *
1
ˆ ˆ1 1 0d d d x x xs wF s w F PY
  
   

   
     
 
 (A5.7) 
         * * * * * * *
1
ˆ ˆ1 1 0x x x d d ds wF s w F P Y
  
   

   
     
 
 (A5.7*) 
  
11
* ** * 11 1
* *
ˆ1
ˆ1
x x
x x
sw P F Y
w s P F Y
 
  

 
       
       
       
 (A5.8)  
 
Whist, as in the autarkic case, simplifying parameter restrictions can be found to yield an analytical 
solution for the variables of interest, the resulting solutions will still be highly nonlinear in the 
parameters and remain analytically intractable. However, using an in depth numerical examination 
of the above equations with identical countries – that is after imposing the restriction  
   * * * * * * * *, , , , , , , = , , , , , , ,d x d xe e               –  and based on varying the values of these 
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parameters within the plausible range,  we can ascertain that unique interior solution exists and 
the reduced form  utility functions have the desired concavity properties to  enable viable optimal  
 
policy exercises. Given that we only consider symmetric solutions in which the two countries are 
assumed to be identical in all respects except in the value of the subsidy rates they choose, we 
have based the initial solution on the values used in the autarkic case. Hence we retained the same 
initial values for the parameters, i.e. 0.00035, 0.25,e   0.5, 3.1, 3.8     , but to 
distinguish between the fixed cost of exports and domestic production we have set 0.0005x   
and retained 0.00025d   . We have also assumed an initial trade cost of   1.1.   
 The two equations in (32) in the paper are respectively obtained from (A5.1) and (A5.2*) and 
(A5.1*) and (A5.2) which imply:  
  
 
 
 
 
1 1* * * *
1 1
* ** *
11 ˆ ˆ
,
ˆ ˆ11
dd d d d d
x x x x xx
s ws w
s ws w
  
     
   
  
 
       
       
          
 (A5.9) 
 Recalling that * 1w   and imposing    * *, = ,d x d x     based on the assumption of identical 
countries, equations (A5.3), (A5.3*) and (A5.9) can then be solved to determine ˆx  and 
*ˆ
x  in 
terms of w and the subsidies: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/
2
1
*
1
1
*
1
11
1
**
1 1
1
11
1
ˆ ,
1
1 1
1 1
11
d d d d d
x x xx x
x x
x
d d dd
x xx x
s s
ss
s
e s s w
ss





  

 


 
  







  
                 
     
                   
   
 (A5.11)
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
1/
2
1
*
1
1
*
*
*
1
* * 11
1
1 1
1
111
ˆ .
1
1 11 1
1 1
d d d d d
x x xx x
x x
x
d d d d
x x x x
s s
sss
e s s
s s w





  

 

 
  
 






  
              
    
                      
 (A5.12) 
These can then be substituted back in (A5.9) to determine ˆd  and 
*ˆ
d  in terms of w and the 
subsidies. Equations (36), (39) and (42) in the paper are special cases of the above where we have 
imposed the respective subsidy choice and set w=1 which holds in any symmetric solution.  
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Setting * * 0d x d xs s s s    , and eliminating , , , , , , , , , ,d x d x d x d x d xp p y y l l r r    , ,d x  M and xM  
by relevant substitutions,   the equations in Appendix 4 are written as the following 15 equations 
which determine  * * * * * * *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,d x d x P P F F H H Y Y T T w    . Again we have kept 
*w  
explicitly in these equations to highlight their symmetric form but recall that * 1w   holds.  
   
1
1
ˆ
1
d d
Y w
P
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
    
 (A6.1) 
   
1* *
1
* *
*
ˆ
1
d d
Y w
P
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
   
 (A6.1*) 
   
1*
1 1
*
ˆ
1
x x
Y w
P
 
    
 
 
         
    
 (A6.2) 
   
1*
1
* * 1ˆ
1
x x
Y w
P
 
    
 
 

        
    
 (A6.2*)  
       
1
ˆ ˆ 1
1
d d x x e
   
    

    
   
 
  (A6.3) 
       * * * * * *
1
ˆ ˆ 1
1
d d x x e
   
    

    
   
 
 (A6.3*) 
  weF T   (A6.4) 
  
* * * * *v w e F T  (A6.4*) 
     
 11
ˆ ˆ 0
1
d d x x
eF H
F
   
   
 
     
   
  
 (A6.5) 
     
 * * *
* * * *
*
11
0
1
d d x x
e F H
F
   
   
 
     
   
  
 (A6.5*) 
  
 
1/ /
1/
Y
H
w P
  


  (A6.6)     
  
   
 
* * *
*
1/ /
* *
*
1/
* *
Y
H
w P
  


  (A6.6*) 
     * * * *
1
ˆ ˆ 0d d x xwF w F PY
  
   

   
   
 
 (A6.7) 
     * * * * * *
1
ˆ ˆ 0x x d dwF w F P Y
  
   

   
   
 
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 (A6.8) 
Analytical solutions similar to those in the wage subsidy case can be derived from the above 
equations. The initial numerical solution used in the analysis is based on the no subsidy version 
of the model and therefor is identical to that used in the wage subsidy case. 
 
